Title:

First-price sealed-bid auction with additional price negotiations: Theoretical analyses and results of experiments

Group publication title:

Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu

Creator:

Kuśmierczyk, Paweł

Description:

Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu = Research Papers of Wrocław University of Economics; 2009; Nr 59, s. 269-277

Abstrakt:

Auctions, which play a significant role in Western countries’ economies, are also becoming more and more popular in CEE countries. They are a simple, efficient and transparent procedure of making market transactions. An auction is a very broad term which can mean any design in which goods are allocated to economic agents. In standard auctions in which few buyers compete for one unit (or many units) of a particular good an auction mechanism allocates the good(s) to the bidder(s) offering the highest price(s). In a procurement auction the whole procedure is reversed. Few sellers compete and one of them will provide a specified good (or specified goods) and the auction mechanism allocates the good(s) to the bidder(s) offering the lowest price(s). (fragment tekstu)

Publisher:

Publishing House of the Wrocław University of Economics

Place of publication:

Wroclaw

Date:

2009

Resource Type:

artykuł

Language:

eng

Relation:

Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu = Research Papers of Wrocław University of Economics; 2009; Nr 59 ; Global Challenges and Policies of the European Union – Consequences for the “New Member States”

Rights:

Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone (Copyright)

Access Rights:

Dla wszystkich w zakresie dozwolonego użytku

Location:

Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

Coverage:

Dofinansowano z programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" Ministra Edukacji i Nauki (SONB/SP/546390/2022). Tytuł projektu: Upowszechnienie zawartości czasopisma Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu