@misc{Forlicz_Stefan_Problemy_2005,
 author={Forlicz, Stefan},
 year={2005},
 rights={Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone (Copyright)},
 description={Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu; 2005; nr 1090, s. 109-114},
 publisher={Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej im. Oskara Langego we Wrocławiu},
 language={pol},
 abstract={This paper presents a wide spectrum of problems concerning the exchange of information between actors of collective actions. First, the agreement of common knowledge which makes possible planning, preparation and execution of collective actions is often very difficult and sometimes just unfeasible. Second, positive costs of search and transmission of information can cause that the participation in collective actions will be unprofitable for individual actors. Third, there do occur the situations of asymmetric information, that is situations where one actor knows something that another actor does not so the problems of hidden characteristics, hidden intention and moral hazard can arise. And last but not least the imperfect transmission of information through the information channel makes the exchange of information between participants of collective actions difficult and can lead to failure.},
 title={Problemy informacyjne działań zbiorowych},
 type={artykuł},
}